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Resumo. Sabemos pelo Críton (49 c10–11) e pela República (335 e5–6) que o Sócrates de 
Platão rejeita explicitamente toda ideia de retaliação. Essa visão é reforçada posterior-
mente no Górgias (480 a6–481 b5), passagem esta que ainda não foi totalmente discu-
tida. Nela, Sócrates confronta a tradicional máxima “ὠφελεῖν τοὺς φίλους καὶ βλάπτειν τοὺς 
ἐχθροὺς” (“ajudar os amigos e prejudicar os inimigos”) ao transformá-la redicalmente 
em “ὠφελεῖν τοὺς φίλους καὶ ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς” (“ajudar os amigos e ajudar os inimi-
gos”). A ética socrática não aprova que se cometa qualquer tipo injustiça.
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The well-known traditional idea “ὠφελεῖν τοὺς φίλους καὶ βλάπτειν τοὺς 
ἐχθροὺς”1 complies with the concept of ensuring one’s own interest by help-
ing one’s friends and harming one’s enemies. Retaliation in the form of re-
ciprocation of benefits or harms forms the basis whereupon this traditional 
precept is founded. However, when it comes to Socratic ethics, a question 
arises immediately: what is the Socratic approach towards this principle 
known as talio2? Plato depicts Socrates rejecting the idea of retaliation: In the 
Crito, he concludes that “one should never treat anyone unjustly, not even 
as a return for an injustice” (49 c 10–11),3 while, in the Republic, he concludes 
that “in no case can the harming of another be just” (335 e5–6),4 although 
his interlocutor in the Meno claims to know what “a man’s virtue” (ἀνδρὸς 
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1  Many scholars have stressed the fact that this idea pervades Greek popular thought, see 
for example Kitto 1969, 243–7; Pearson 1962, 15–17, 86–89; Dover 1974, 180–84; Vlastos 1980, 
303–7. For a detailed examination of this precept, see especially Blundell 1989, 26–59; cf. Cohen 
1995, 61–118. For an opposite view, namely that this idea does not in fact pervade Greek popular 
thought, see Herman 2000, 7–27; Harris 2005, 125–42.
2  The essence of talio is reciprocation. Talio is the Latin legal term for “repayment in kind” 
(talio<tale= “such as”), see Blundell 1989, 28 n. 15; Vlastos 1991, 181.
3  οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ’ ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν.
4  οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδένα ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ὂν βλάπτειν. Xenophon, on the other hand, depicts Socrates 
endorsing repeatedly the traditional precept “to help one’s friends and to harm one’s enemies”, 
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ἀρετή) is: “to be able to manage the city’s affairs, and to manage them so as 
to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies, and to be careful so that 
no harm comes to himself” (71 e).5 The aim of this paper is to shed new light 
on Gorgias 480 a6–481 b6 not only by unfolding and elucidating how, under 
the influence of the Socratic ethics, the traditional idea “to help one’s friends 
and to harm one’s enemies” is transformed into “to help one’s friends and to 
help one’s enemies” – thus proving that this passage contributes greatly to 
the expansion of the Platonic testimony in favour of Socrates’ rejection of re-
taliation –, but also by clarifying how the Socratic theory of the rejection of 
retaliation per se is inextricably linked to his theory of eudaimonia: Socratic 
ethics does not approve one’s doing injustice in any way.
SOCRATES’ CONVERSATION WITH POLUS (461 b2–481 b5)
Socrates examines rhetoric as a craft claiming to benefit its practi-
tioners. He argues that it is no real craft – since it is not concerned with 
the good – but rather an empirical skill in producing pleasure, a form of 
flattery (κολακεία) that cannot give any rational account of its procedure. In 
fact, it does not confer any benefit upon the rhetor, since it provides him 
with a power that is not a real good. While Polus has said that rhetors do 
“whatever they want” (βούλεσθαι), exercising more power than anyone else, 
Socrates claims that they do not do “what they want to” but “whatever it 
seems good to them” (δοκεῖν βέλτιστον). This distinction is of paramount im-
portance. Doing what someone thinks best with intelligence (νοῦς) results 
in good for the agent; but if his actions are not accompanied by intelligence 
(cf. 458 b), they result in no benefit. Socrates further clarifies what he means 
by this distinction:
(i) First, there are activities which we pursue for their own sakes, as being 
themselves good; secondly, there are activities which we pursue for the 
sake of something else.
(ii) Humans pursue what is intermediate for the sake of what is good. All 
voluntary actions are done with a view to benefiting the agent (the 
agent’s good, cf. 468 b1). On the contrary, involuntary actions are those 
see Memorabilia 2.1.19, 2.3.14, 2.6.35. On why Plato’s testimony should be preferred to Xenophon’s 
on this point, see Vlastos 1991, 297–300.
5  ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ’ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, καὶ 
αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν.
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which result in harm for the agent (the idea in question is contained in 
the famous dictum οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κακὸς or οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει).
Consequently, in order to justify his claim, namely that rhetoric does not 
provide the rhetor with a real good, Socrates proceeds to say what a real 
good is, thereby arguing against Polus that we are better off being just than 
being unjust.
THE LAST PART OF THE CONVERSATION WITH POLUS: 
THE PASSAGE UNDER CONSIDERATION (480A6-481B5)
A brief summary
In this passage, Socrates returns to the consideration of the value of 
rhetoric. The main question arising from a first reading is the following: 
what is the value and usefulness of rhetoric, given the fact that, as the pre-
ceding conversations point out, a man should protect himself from doing 
injustice, because doing injustice entails a great enough evil (κακόν)? Ac-
cording to Socrates, if a man or whoever else he cares about acts unjustly, 
he must directly present himself (or his friend) before the court in order to 
be punished: in that case, he will prevent the disease of injustice from be-
ing protracted and making his soul festering incurably. Socrates maintains 
that rhetoric is useful to one only if intended, primarily, to accuse oneself, 
thereafter one’s relatives as well as each of one’s friends, of doing injustice.
Having completed the treatment on the first part of rhetoric’s useful-
ness in respect of benefitting oneself and one’s friends, thenceforth Socrates 
examines the second part: the way in which one must treat rhetoric, aiming 
at harming an enemy. The other benefit of rhetoric consists in defending an 
enemy in order not to be punished.
However, approaching the end of the passage, Socrates concludes: 
whoever does not intend to do injustice has no need of rhetoric. In other 
words, under these circumstances, rhetoric has no usefulness—if indeed it 
has any usefulness at all, since it was not evident in the conversation with 
Gorgias.
A further analysis
After briefly exposing the views unfolded in the passage under 
consideration, I can move onto a further analysis. To sum up, Polus’ main 
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interests consist in the concept of personal gain, unconditional power,6 
flattering, being pretentious, concealing falsehood with a view to achiev-
ing unconditional ruling (ἄρχειν). According to Polus, the greatest power 
(δύναμις) amounts to acting according to one’s own desires, which entails 
unconditional ruling (ἄρχειν, cf. 452 d7, 483 d5, 488 b4, 490 a2) without being 
punished, regardless of the just or unjust characterization of one’s actions. 
In other words, Polus focuses on the special outcome resulting from per-
forming special deeds rather than on the manner or the intention of their 
performance. The fact that Polus presents the actual stages of Archelaus’ 
obtaining unconditional tyrannical power indicates a special modification 
of the traditional precept “to help one’s friends and to harm one’s enemies”. 
This specific alteration is showed in the following form:
(1.1) “To help oneself, to harm one’s friends, to harm one’s enemies”
The above protasis dictates a kind of behaviour in accordance with 
the tyrannical pattern, which has its roots in the heroic pursuit of ruling 
(ἄρχειν).7 Ruling constitutes the hero’s main goal due to the fact that the 
promotion of his honour (τιμή) is the ultimate goal to which his steps are 
always directed. Ἀγαθὸς (good man) in the Homeric poems denotes a brave, 
successful warrior of noble birth and high social status, capable of deliv-
ering speeches, taking decisions and effectively ruling his own household 
(οἶκος).8 For that purpose, the hero needs some help from his friends in 
order to ensure his honour. As Arthur W. H. Adkins says,9 “philotes is co-
operation to meet the harsh demands of Homeric life”. The pervasive fea-
ture of Greek popular morality, namely the assumption that one should 
help one’s friends and harm one’s enemies, is deeply rooted in Homer, the 
“fountainhead of all Greek literature and thought”, as Mary W. Blundell 
points out.10
Both heroic and tyrannical types of conduct share the same goals in 
terms of pursuing unconditional ruling. However, the Homeric hero relies 
on his friends for supporting him in coping with the demands of Homeric 
life. Archelaus’ example illustrates the fact that an insidious tyrant’s deeds 
include harming friends or enemies without exception in order to achieve 
6  Cf. Santas 1979, 247. 
7  Cf. Adkins 1972, 73–5.
8  Cf. Adkins 1972, 11–13. 
9  Adkins 1972, 17. 
10  Adkins 1972, 26 n.2.
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his end. The tyrant has no real friends. In establishing successful relation-
ships, he seeks to promote his own interest.11
According to Polus, the idea of unconditional tyrannical power un-
derlies the restructured traditional precept that the protasis 1.1 suggests. 
The relish of impunity marking the exercise of unconditional power im-
plies, in Polus’ terms, eudaimonia. Thus, Polus’ eudaimonia-pattern is sum-
marized in the following:
(1.2.) The unpunished unjust man = the most eudaimon
Socrates is challenged to defend his theory on the value of punish-
ment in contrast with thesis 1.2 that Polus presents as ideal. For that pur-
pose, he evokes the traditional precept “to help one’s friends and to harm 
one’s enemies”, since he believes that the ideas embedded in this theory 
reflect special concepts and terms that can be easily understood by Polus. 
Thus, Socrates, initially, appears to argue for that precept, which is much 
more clearly articulated in the following:
(2.1.) “To help oneself, to help one’s friends, to harm one’s enemies”
Socrates quickly clarifies himself with respect to the above idea, while 
determining the true value of rhetoric. He maintains that rhetoric is useful 
to one only if intended, primarily, to accuse oneself, thereafter one’s relatives 
as well as each of one’s friends, of doing injustice. The substantial utility of 
rhetoric must be determined by the disclosure of truth. Unlike the heroic 
and tyrannical pattern, Socratic ethics teaches us that one’s friend’s real ben-
efit does not consist in the concealment of injustice, but in its disclosure. One 
can easily observe the diametrically opposed practices of lying and truth-
telling. For Socrates, veracity is the only way to bring about punishment and 
the soul’s deliverance from the greatest evil (μέγιστον κακόν), that is, injustice. 
The vital difference between the two value systems (conventional morality 
– Socratic ethics) results from the contrasting evaluation and the distinction 
between good (ἀγαθόν) and evil (κακόν). What conventional morality, founded 
on traditional ethics,12 considers as a friend’s harm is, according to Socratic 
11  Cf. Rebecca Bensen Cain’s (2008, 225) description of Polus’ priorities: “…doing whatever it 
takes to survive and having the power that guarantees success taking precedence over the values 
of justice and shame”. For the portrait of the typical tyrant, see Herodotus, History 3.80–3; Plato, 
Republic 574a6–576a6; Aristotle, Politics 1311a–1315b. See further Dodds 1959, 344; Adkins 1972, 
67-75; Tarnopolsky 2010, 23–26, 110–13. 
12  Adkins (1960, 266–8) notes that Polus represents the muddleheadedness of ordinary values, 
the confusion of values existing in Athens at this period, resulting from the infiltration of the 
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ethics, nothing but a friend’s benefit. Socrates offers a special redirection of 
the traditional precept “to help one’s friends and to harm one’s enemies”, 
which brings about the revision and redefinition of the concept of real ben-
efit. Socratic ethics does not focus on the camouflage of injustice or the pre-
tense of justice, but on the disclosure of injustice, on truth and just (δίκαιον). 
Therefore, a man must use rhetoric as a means of disclosing a specific unjust 
deed in order to purge himself – or his friends – from it, ensuring a special 
state of health. Generally, one must include rhetorical practice among one’s 
actions, which should, in any case, be addressed towards good (ἀγαθόν) and 
fine (καλόν) without taking any account of the pain (ἀλγεινόν).
Socrates completes the first part of rhetoric’s usefulness in respect of 
benefitting oneself and one’s friends, being able, at the same time, to reach 
the end of the appropriate treatment on the first half of the traditional pre-
cept (“helping friends”). Now, he examines the way in which one must treat 
rhetoric aiming at harming an enemy (κακῶς ποιεῖν). Socrates maintains that, 
if one indeed should harm one13 who treats unjustly a third one – provided 
that he himself is not being treated unjustly by the enemy, something that 
should be avoided, since to be treated unjustly also indicates one’s harm14 –, 
he must take care to avoid the enemy’s attendance at court in order not to 
be punished for his unjust deed. It is noteworthy that what the proponents 
of traditional morality or tyrannical power deem shameful, that is, an en-
emy’s benefitting by means of ensuring his impunity, is exactly the same 
as what Socrates considers as harm. This wide ideological divergence is 
based on a differentiated good – an evaluation relying on a further distinc-
tion between opinion (δόξα) and knowledge or, in other words, between false 
quiet moral excellences into the group of terms based on agathos. Cf. Kahn 1983, 95–6; Johnson 
1989, 197 n. 2. For a somehow different idea, namely that Polus is insincerely tailoring his remarks 
to conventional Athenian wisdom, see Kahn 1983, 117. Richard McKim (1988, 40) holds a 
different view. Furthermore, for the idea that Polus is confused and perplexed by what he actually 
considers as admirable and shameful, see for example Dodds 1959, 11–12; Benardete 1991, 40–1. 
See Tarnopolsky 2010, 65–78, for a careful examination of these views.
13  The conditional has prompted considerable scholarly discussion. Terence Irwin (1979, 168) 
notices that “the conditional (cf. HMi. 376b) shows that Socrates does not necessarily endorse this 
use of rhetoric to harm enemies. He normally insists that we should harm no one, Cri. 49b–d, R. 
333b-336a”. George Kimball Plochmann and Franklin E. Robinson (1988, 370 n. 19) say: “Here 
Socrates does not directly contradict the import of his question (Republic 1.335b), Whether a good 
man should harm anyone at all?”. John Beversluis (2000, 338 n.39) contends that “It should not be 
inferred that, in saying this, Socrates is endorsing the lex talionis, thereby renouncing his interdict 
on retaliation (Cr. 49b10–11) and opting for the Simonidean – Polemarchian view of justice as 
helping one’s friends and harming one’s enemies”. John Beversluis criticizes Eric R. Dodds (1959, 
259) for overlooking the fact that this passage “has a deeper and more unsettling implication. Those 
who do cover up for their friends and relatives by failing to prosecute them and by helping them to 
escape punishment, are, in fact, harming them and thereby treating them as if they were enemies”. 
14  See Dodds 1959, 259. Cf. 469c1–2. 
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opinion (ψευδὴς δόξα) and right opinion (ὀρθὴ δόξα).15 Consequently, if a man 
has embezzled money, he must be allowed to keep on spending it to his 
own and his friends’ advantage, continually showing an unjust and disre-
spectful pattern of behaviour; furthermore, if a man has done injustice in a 
way worthy of the death penalty, he must not be punished but be allowed to 
continue living an unjust life. Thus, in Socrates’ opinion, the greatest harm 
that one can inflict on one’s enemy is to leave him unpunished, namely 
to allow him to still live as wicked (πονηρός) and unjust, since this is the 
real harm of the soul which brings him wretchedness. Socrates achieves his 
goal of reversing the traditional precept “to help one’s friends and to harm 
one’s enemies” with the assistance of those terms and verbal-ideological 
means that can be easily perceived by Polus, the “extreme” representative 
of traditional ethics. On the basis of the above reasoning, Socrates offers a 
counter-proposal to Polus’ idea 1.2:
(2.2.) The unpunished unjust man = the most wretched man 
Socrates gives the unpunished unjust man the last position on the 
newly introduced eudaimonia-scale. According to the Socratic value system, 
the greatest wickedness is identical with injustice correlated with impunity. 
Polus’ defending of unconditional power is restricted to merely phenom-
enal benefit, anchored in unreflected opinion, thoughtless mind and false 
belief. The benefit to one’s self and one’s friends is closely related to the soul. 
The truly great power lies on the good, the benefit, which right opinion, re-
sulting from the deductive reasoning exercise, and truth dictate: namely a 
punishment based on justice which aims at healing the soul. After putting 
the finishing touches to his theory of punishment, Socrates concludes with 
the following idea: 
(2.3.) The punished unjust man = less wretched man than the unpunished 
unjust man
Consequently, the punished unjust man is ranked in a higher posi-
tion than the unpunished unjust man on the suggested eudaimonia-scale. 
The utility of rhetoric lies in the disclosure of injustice. Injustice forms the 
soul’s major evil, which is eventually healed by means of punishment and 
justice implementation.
15  The true good is what one really wants (ἑκών), as opposed to what one thinks (δόξα) one 
wants (apparent good), cf. Plato, Gorgias 466b–e. In other words, what one really wants (ἑκών) is 
what one knows (or rightly believes) to be the best.
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Had the conversation with Polus ended precisely at this point, one 
would have deduced quite different conclusions about the main objective 
of the whole Socratic dialectic method addressed towards his interlocutor 
in the general context of the passage under consideration. However, So-
crates emphasizes that whoever does not intend to do injustice has no need 
of rhetoric. It is noteworthy that it has not been proved yet to what extent 
rhetoric is useful. Thus, now, the value and usefulness of rhetoric are being 
called into question again. Socrates contends that the just man, namely the 
one who performs just deeds, has no need of rhetoric. At this point, let us 
recall some previous Socratic views in the dialogue in order to facilitate the 
interpretation of the whole passage:
a) Just things (δίκαια) are fine (καλά). Therefore, he who performs just deeds 
performs fine deeds; and if they are fine, they are good (ἀγαθά) as well (fine 
and good being identical) (476 b ff.);
b) The fine and good (καλὸς κἀγαθός) man and woman are eudaimones, but 
the unjust and wicked are wretched” (470 e 10); 
c) Ultimate eudaimonia is found in the health of the body and soul (478c3). 
Secondly, eudaimonia is found in the relief of the body and soul from 
evil (κακόν). In view of the soul’s superiority in relation to the body, So-
crates’ concept of καλοκἀγαθία (the quality of being a fine and good man)16 
is founded on the health and well-being of the soul; 
d) The idea of a soul’s well-being implies the Socratic concept of the unity 
of virtues. The soul’s welfare represents soul’s virtue, that is, justice 
(δικαιοσύνη), temperance (σωφροσύνη), courage (ἀνδρεία), knowledge/ wisdom 
(σοφία) or good opinion (ὀρθὴ δόξα) founded on dialectic reasoning (cf. 477c). 
Combining the above ideas with the present Socratic assertion, it follows 
that:
(3.1.) The just man = the most eudaimon
Socrates gives just and justice a central role in the concept of eudai-
monia. The just man is the most eudaimon. He has no need of rhetoric or 
flattering leading to insincere or feigned behaviour. The best weapon in his 
arsenal does not consist in falsehood but in truth, relying on knowledge 
or right opinion, namely that type of an as yet unrefuted opinion, which 
is deduced by exercising critical reasoning questions. This is the point on 
16  I use the abstract noun καλοκἀγαθία as a derivative of καλὸς κἀγαθός, denoting the quality of 
the latter, such as κακία is a derivative of κακός. 
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which actual utmost power is based. The just man is the most eudaimon, 
enjoying his soul’s state of health. One’s healthy – via justice – soul deter-
mines one’s quality of being a fine and good man (καλοκἀγαθία). Socratic eth-
ics dictate the only type of real benefit: justice. The soul’s virtue resides 
in justice, temperance, courage, knowledge/wisdom or true opinion.17 It is 
this idea that establishes the Socratic unity of virtues18 and the famous So-
cratic views “no one errs willingly” and “no one willingly performs bad 
deeds”. Socrates and Polus agreed that all men consider good as their ul-
timate goal in life (468b). For Socrates, as we have already seen, real good 
depends on the soul’s benefit related to justice and the rest of virtue. Thus, 
one can safely conclude that, by the term fine and good (καλὸς κἀγαθός), So-
crates means nothing less than being just, temperate, courageous, a man 
of practical wisdom who knows and performs just and good deeds result-
ing in his eudaimonia. This leads naturally to the verification of the idea of 
the Crito (49 c 10–11) “οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, 
οὐδ’ ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν” and the Republic (335e5–6) “οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δίκαιον 
οὐδένα ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ὂν βλάπτειν”.
CONCLUSION
The above analysis leads irrevocably to a certain conclusion. The no-
tion of talio, representing the cornerstone, firstly, of the traditional precept 
“to help oneself, to help one’s friends, to harm one’s enemies” and, secondly, 
of the tyrannical precept “to help oneself, to harm one’s friends, to harm 
one’s enemies”, is finally repudiated. In Gorgias 480 a6–481 b6, a thorough 
transformation is noted of both traditional and tyrannical precepts under 
the influence of Socratic ethics focusing on the crucial distinction between 
opinion and knowledge, or, in other words, between false opinion and right 
opinion, as well as between the apparent and the real good-benefit. Such wis-
17  Cf. Santas 1979, 253. 
18  Charles H. Kahn (1983, 95) notes: “the elenchus here brings into the open…a deeper conflict 
between two equal traditional but incompatible ideals of human excellence: (A) the heroic or 
competitive notion of arete¯ formulated in the motto of Achilles: ‘always be the first and best 
ahead of everyone else’… (b) the ideal of measure and moderation, knowing one’s limitations 
as a mortal and one’s duties as a citizen”. In p. 96 he adds: “It was one of Socrates’ greatest 
achievements to reshape these two conceptions into a new and consistent moral ideal, the unity 
of virtues founded on wisdom and on the cooperative excellences, pushing justice to a new and 
revolutionary demands (‘never harm anyone, even an enemy’), but remaining faithful to the old 
ideal of manliness by fearlessly risking and finally giving up his life in the cause of justice and 
loyalty to moral principle”. 
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dom, consisting in the knowledge of good and evil, is the result of the whole 
process of exposing one’s deeply held views to co-examination, eventually 
leading him to reject the false opinions and certify the true ones. Now, the 
reformulated idea, revealing the basic principles of Socratic philosophy, can 
be summarized in the following:
(3.2.) “To help oneself, to help one’s friends, to help one’s enemies”
This reformulated idea, marking a concomitant reconceptualization 
of the main concept of benefit and a complete repudiation of one’s harming, 
shows that the so-called Socratic intellectualism does not promote exclu-
sively one’s own interest at the expense of altruistic intentions. The concept 
of real benefit is short of any idea of reciprocity, becoming a direct conse-
quence of a just deed. Here in the conversation with Polus Plato declares 
that rhetoric of the kind celebrated by Polus cannot be the key to living 
well. To value the kind of power rhetoric claims to offer is to hold a false 
view of what is beneficial to someone. By seeing—through the dialectical 
discussion—why this view is false, humans reach a true view of what is 
good, in this way understanding why it is better for the agent, as well as for 
the patient, to be just than to be unjust. The cardinal virtues, suggested by 
Socrates, are related to private-individual benefit as much as to the whole 
community advantage. Eventually, the predominance of justice and the rest 
of virtue indicates the predominance of cooperative values over any com-
petitive value system.
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*
Abstract. As we know from the Crito (49c10–11) and from the Republic (335e5–6), Pla-
to’s Socrates explicitly rejects any idea of retaliation. This view is further strengthened 
by Gorgias (480a6–481b5), a passage that has not been extensively discussed yet. In 
the passage in question, Socrates challenges the traditional maxim “ὠφελεῖν τοὺς φίλους 
καὶ βλάπτειν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς” (“helping friends and harming enemies”) by radically chang-
ing it into “ὠφελεῖν τοὺς φίλους καὶ ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς” (“helping friends and helping 
enemies”). Socratic ethics does not approve one’s doing injustice in any way.
Keywords. Socrates; Plato; Gorgias; retaliation; injustice; ethics.
